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LIABILITY OF ACCOMMODATION ENDORSER
LIABILITY OF ACCOMMODATION INDORSER.
Prior to the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law
in 1905 the rule in this State was well established that an
indorser was a person secondarily liable, and being second-
arily liable, he was discharged, amongst other things, by an
agreement entered into between the payee and maker of the
note for the extension of time of payment without his consent.
A person placing his signature on the back of a negotiable
instrument before delivery was prior to 1905 prima facie a co-
maker and primarily liable upon the instrument.2
The enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law in this
State in 1905 followed its adoption in many other States and
was intended to remove any doubt that the decisions of the
various States created as to the liability of parties to a ne-
gotiable instrument. In spite of the fact that the various
provisions of the act have been construed by the courts whose
States enacted the Negotiable Instruments Law before its
adoption in 1905 in this State, and in spite of the fact that
no ambiguity at all is to be found in any provisions of the law,
the status of an accommodation indorser of negotiable paper
is somewhat in doubt in this State. This doubt has been
created by a rather extraordinary and peculiar decision of
the St. Louis Court of Appeals in the case of Night & Day
Bank v. Rosenbaum,3 which is one of the very late decisions
of that court dealing with the liability of such an indorser.
This opinion deserves consideration not only because its con-
clusions seem to be in conflict with the plain provisions of the
statute, but also because it is undoubtedly in conflict with the
construction placed upon those provisions of the statute by
earlier decisions of the St. Louis Court of Appeals.
1. 69 Mo. 543; 19 Mo. 263; 27 Mo. 501; 63 Mo. 46; 65 Mo. 562; 68 Mo.
234.
2. BrannanB N. I. L., p. 238.
3. 191 Mo. App. 559.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW EEVIEW.
The facts in that case were these: The Southwestern Pro-
duce Distributors, a corporation, executed and delivered sev-
eral notes to the Night & Day Bank, which notes were indorsed
by L. Rosenbaum for the accommodation of the Southwestern
Produce Distributors at and before their delivery to the Night
& Day Bank. Suit was brought by the Night & Day Bank
against the maker, the Southwestern Produce Distributors,
and Rosenbaum, the accommodation indorser. Rosenbaum in
his defense pleaded first, that the notes were paid, and sec-
ond, that the time of payment was extended to the principal
debtor, the Southwestern Produce Distributors, without his
knowledge or consent. The question for the consideration of
the court, as stated by Judge Nortoni, was the defense of the
defendant, Rosenbaum, to the effect that, being an accommo-
dation indorser, he was discharged from liability because of
a valid and binding agreement for an extension of the time of
payment entered into betveen the plaintiff bank and the prin-
cipal debtor, Southwestern Produce Distributors, without his
consent,
After discussing the question as to whether or not there
was evidence of a binding agreement for an extension of time
for the payment of the notes by the principal debtor, Judge
Nortoni, on page 566, continues:
"The evidence is not clear as to this, but for the purposes
of the case, it may be conceded that such consideration ap-
pears. We say this, for that, in any view, the defendant,
Rosenbaum, is not entitled to be discharged because of an ex-
tension of time to the principal debtor under the provisions of
our Negotiable Instruments Law, and this is true even though
such extensions were granted to the maker for a definite
period on a valid consideration. Under each of the several
notes that is an assent. * * * * * Formerly a valid and binding
agreement entered into between the principal maker and the
holder of the note on sufficient consideration, by which the
time for payment was extended to the maker to a day certain,
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operated to discharge an accommodation indorser who was
then regarded secondarily liable and stood in the relation of
surety, but this is no longer true. All the notes in suit here
were executed and delivered subsequent to the adoption of
our Negotiable Instruments statutes which materially changed
the rule in respect of this matter. (Daniels on Negotiable
Instruments.) * * * * * It is conceded for the purpose of this
case, and indeed there is no evidence to the contrary, that
defendant is an accommodation indorser in each instance, and
if as such he was secondarily liable on the instrument, he is
entitled to his discharge; otherwise not."
After quoting Sec. 10000, R. S. of Mo., 1909, the opinion
further states:
"The statute expressly declares that such person is liable
on the instrument to the holder for value, notwithstanding
such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to
be only an accommodation party. This being true, he is to be
regarded as primarily liable thereon, under the provisions of
Sec. 10161, R. S. of Mo., 1909. Indeed, an accommodation
maker was primarily liable to the holder of the instrument
before the statute as has been determined by our Supreme
Court; and the statute now renders such an indorser the
same."
A further examination of the opinion clearly indicates that
it is based upon the conclusion reached by Judge Nortoni, that
the Negotiable Instruments Law abrogated the rule formerly
existing in this and other States to the effect that an indorser,
whether he be an accommodation indorser or otherwise, is a
party secondarily liable, and that it rendered such indorser
primarily liable on the instrument.
Unless then, the Negotiable Instruments Law does in fact
create that liability for the indorser, Judge Nortoni's de-
cision is absolutely without foundation.
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Section 10000, R. S. of Mo., 1909, now Section 816, R. S.
of Mo., 1919, defines an accommodation party and fixes his
liability as follows:
"An accommodation party is one who has signed the in-
strument as maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser, without
receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his
name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the
instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder
at the time of taking such instrument knew him to be only an
accommodation party."
Section 10033, R. S. of Mo., 1909, now Section 849, R. S.
of Mo., 1919, defines the status of a person indorsing an in-
strument, and provides as follows:
"A person placing his signature upon an instrument other-
wise than as maker, drawer or acceptor, is deemed to be an
indorser unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his
intention to be bound in some other capacity."
Section 10034 defines the status of a person not otherwise
a party to the instrument, who places his signature thereon,
before delivery, and fixes his liability in accordance with cer-
tain rules.
Section 10161, R. S. of Mo., 1909, now Section 981, R. S.
of Mo., 1919, provides as follows:
"The person primarily liable on an instrument is a person
who, by the terms of the instrument, is absolutely required to
pay the same. All other parties are secondarily liable."
Section 10090, R. S. of Mo., 1909, now Section 906, R. S. of
Mo., 1919, provides that:
"A person secondarily liable on an instrument is dis-
charged (sub-section 6) by an agreement binding upon the
holder to extend the time of payment or to postpone the hold-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol8/iss1/2
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er's right to enforce the instrument unless made with the
assent of the party secondarily liable or unless the right or
recourse against such party is expressly reserved."
t will thus be seen that according to the plain provisions
of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a person placing his sig-
nature upon an instrument, otherwise than as maker, drawer
or acceptor, is deemed to be an indorser; that as an indorser
he is not the person who, by the terms of the instrument, is
absolutely required to pay the same; that he is not primarily
but secondarily liable, and therefore becomes discharged
under Section 10090, by an agreement binding upon the holder
to extend the time of payment.
The Negotiable Instruments Law insofar as the liability
of an indorser is concerned merely enacted the rule of the
common law. What it did abrogate was the rule at common
law, that a person placing his name upon the back of an in-
strument before delivery was prima facie a co-maker and pri-
marily liable, and renders such person liable as an indorser
and precludes the introduction of parol testimony to change
his status.'
It also changed the rule of common law that an accommo-
dation maker was liable as surety by providing that parties
signing for the accommodation of others, whether as accep-
tors, drawers, makers or indorsers, should be liable according
to the capacity in which they signed the instrument, be it as
maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser, without regard to the
fact that they were merely parties to the instrument for the
accommodation of others.5
This construction has been placed upon the various pro-
visions of the Negotiable Instruments Law by courts of every
State in which it has been enacted, including courts of our
own State.
4. Winters v. Overland Auto Co., 277 Mo. 429; Brannan's Negotiable
Instruments Law, p. 238; Canada v. Chuttee, 235 S. W. 824.
5. Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, 98 N. E. 679; Wolstenholme v. Smith,
34 Utah 800; Greenberg v. Ginsberg, 143 N. Y. S. 101
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Thus in National Bank v. Hanlon,6 a case in which suit was
brought upon a promissory note executed by the Hanlon
Millinery Company, a corporation, and indorsed by Richard
Hanlon for the accommodation of the corporation, the court
held that the rights of the parties were governed by the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, and referring to Section 10033, R. S.
of Mo., 1909, now Section 849, R. S. of Mo., 1919, the Court
said:
"The effect of this Section was to alter the rule previously
existing in this State to the effect that one who places his
name on the back of a negotiable promissory note before de-
livery was to be considered prima facie as a co-maker.
"In the case before us, there is absolutely nothing to indi-
cate that the defendant's intention was to be bound in any
capacity other than as indorser and hence under the statute
he is to be treated as such. And under Section 10161, R. S. of
Mo., 1909, now Section 906, R. S. of Mo., 1919, it is clear that
defendant is a party secondarily liable on the instrument."
In the case of Walker v. Dunham,7 one of the first cases
after the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the
same conclusion was reached by Judge Reynolds of the St.
Louis Court of Appeals. That was a case in which suit was
filed against defendant, Dunham, and others on a promissory
note executed by Dunham in favor of the plaintiff, Walker.
On the back of the note appeared the signatures of the de-
fendant, Dunham, and others.
In his opinion, Judge Reynolds at page 407, says: "The
law of 1905 was in force at the time the note in controversy
was executed, and governed by the provisions of that law, and
6. 183 Mo. App. 243.
7. 135 Mo. App. 396.
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appellants herein, except the maker of the note, are liable on
the note as indorsers and not as joint makers."
In Canada v. Shuttee,s the same result was reached. That
was a case in which suit was brought upon a note which was
signed by the defendant on the back before delivery to the
plaintiff, who was the payee. Defendant contended that under
the statute his liability was that of an indorser only. The
Court, at page 825, says:
"We are of the opinion that the status of the defendant in
the case at bar is governed by our Negotiable Instruments
Law and not by the law merchant. By Section 849, R. S. of
AMo., 1919, it is provided that a person placing his signature
upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer, or
acceptor, is deemed to be an indorser unless he clearly indi-
eates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some
other capacity. By section 850 it is provided that where a
person not otherwise a party to the instrument, places there-
on his signature in blank before delivery, etc. In Brannan's
Negotiable Instruments Law, page 238, it is stated that the
law has been changed in States which have adopted the Neg,-
tiable Instruments Law, and that where a person signs a note
otherwise than as maker, in blank, before delivery for the
accommodation of the maker, that such person is now charge-
able only as an indorser.9 In support of this statement of
the law the text cites: Deahy v. Choquet, 28 R. I., 338; Peck v.
Easton, 74 Conn., 456; Thorpe v. White, 188 Mass., 333; Toole
v. Crafts, 193 Mass., 110; Wilson v. Hendee, 74 N. J. Law,
6i40; Gibbs v. Guaraglia, 75 N. J. Law, 168."
L. C. 826.
"The overwhelming weight of authority is undoubtedly to
the effect that if one signed a note under the circumstances
8. 235 S. W. 824.
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in the case at bar he is an indorser under the Negotiable In-
struments Law.
"To summarize, we hold that the defendant is relieved in
this case because Section 849, R. S. of 1919, under our Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, makes the relation of a party placing
his signature to an instrument otherwise than as maker,
drawer, or acceptor, that of an indorser. The following sec-
tion, 850, makes such party liable to the payee of a note as an
indorser. Section 875 requires that indorsers under this chap-
ter have notice of dishonor, and such indorser in this case
does not fall within the exceptions provided in Section 901,
R. S. of Mo., 1919.
"As we construe these sections, the payee of a note can
only hold one who has placed his signature upon the note
otherwise than as maker, drawer, or acceptor, to the liability
of an indorser, unless such person indicates his status other-
wise, and in order that he may be held liable by such payee as
indorser, the statutory notice of dishonor must have been
given him"
The Supreme Court in the case of Havlin v. Continental
National Bank,9 held: "The respondent, an accommodation
indorser for Havlin, the maker, on the notes of the bank, was
in contemplation of law a surety."
It will thus be seen that the decision in Night & Day Bank
v. Rosenbaum not only fails to find support in the plain pro-
visions of the Negotiable Instruments Law, but is in conflict
with three opinions by Courts of Appeal of this State in that
it confers primary liability on 4. person who by his signature
assumes only secondary liability.
The provisions of our Negotiable Instruments Law had
been adopted by other States and at the time of its enactment
in this State had been construed by other courts. Invariably
an accommodation indorser has been held only to secondary
liability.
9. Havlhii v. Continental Nat. Bank, 253 Mo., 7. c. 300.
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Thus in Gibbs v. Gnaraglia,' 0 Judge Pitney, page 169, says:
"'The appellant insists that Frank Guaraglia was primarily
liable upon the -note. * * * * The act abrogated the rule of
Chaddock v. Vanners and subjects a person not otherwise a
party to the instrument who places his signature thereon in
blank before delivery to the liability of indorser in favor of
the payee and subsequent parties. We think the trial judge
probably held that the obligation assumed by Frank Guaraglia
was merely the conditional obligation of an ordinary in-
dorser."
And in National Park Bank v. Koehler,"' a decision of the
Court of Appeals of New York, wherein defendant was sued
as an accommodaion indorser and pleaded in defense his dis-
charge because of an extension of time to the maker of the
note without his assent, the Court states: "An accommoda-
tion indorser or surety is entitled to have the engagement of
the principal debtor preserved without variation in its terms
and his assent to any change therein is essential to the contin-
uance of his obligation. Any agreement of the creditor which
operated to extend the time of payment of the original note
and suspends the right to immediate action is held to dis-
charge the non-assenting indorser or surety."
In Greenberg v. Ginsberg,' 2 wherein the defendant was
sued as an accommodation indorser and defended on the
ground that an extension of time had been granted the prin-
cipal, the Court, at page 1019, says: "It is a well established
rule or" law that an indorser of negotiable paper, like any
surety, is entitled to have the engagement of the principal
debtor preserved without variation, and any change or exten-
sion of time granted by the holder to the maker of a prom-
issory note, without the consent of the indorser, discharges
10. 75 N. J. L, 168
11. 204 N. Y. 174.
12. 143 N. Y. Supp. 1017.
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his liability as indorser unless the right of recourse agdinst
the indorser is expressly reserved."
In Deahy v. Choquet, 13 one of the defendants sued as an
accommodation indorser defended on the ground that he had
been discharged by an extension of time granted to Choquet,
the maker.
After quoting provision 6 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, which is exactly the same as provision 6 of Section 906,
R. S. of Mo., 1919, the Court said: "We agree with the Su-
perior Court that the promise not to press the suit on the
note against Choquet was a postponement of the holder's right
to enforce the instrument within the meaning of the law, and
so discharged defendant, Carroll."
Examining the authorities cited by Judge Nortoni in sup-
port of the conclusion reached by him will show beyond doubt
that he was confused into calling an accommodation indorser
a maker. Not only does he use those words interchangeably,
but the cases cited by him were all cases in which the defend-
ant was an accommodation 'maker and attempted to avoid his
primary liability on the ground that as accommodation maker
he was a surety. The courts in those cases very properly held
that although that was the rule at common law, it had been
abrogated by the Negotiable Instruments Law, and that under
the Negotiable Instruments Law, a person was liable on the
instrument according to the liability he took upon himself at
the time of its execution; that a maker could not be heard to
say that he was merely an accommodation naker and only
secondarily liable. Not a single case, however, is cited by
Judge Nortoni, nor is there one to be found, in which the
liability of maker was placed upon a person who, by the very
terms of the instrument, and by the statutes, had only as-
sumed the liability of an indorser.
The quotation from Daniels on Negotiable Instruments
Law undoubtedly refers only to the change in the law as to
13. 28 R. I. 338.
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acconmodation makers, for immediately following the para-
graph set out in the opinion is the following: "An indorser,
however, is a person secondarily liable, is discharged from his
obligation by a promise not to press a suit on the note against
the maker as it is a postponement of the holder's right to en-
force the instrument within the meaning of the law."
It is unfortunate that Judges Reynolds and Allen, who had
in the early cases properly construed the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, lent weight to the decision in Night & Day Bank
v. Rosenbaum, by their concurrence.
An examination of the opinion in the light of the statutes
and the earlier decisions in this and other States will easily
convince one that it is bad law and that it merits the criticism
found in Brannan's Negotiable Instruments Law, 3rd Ed.,
page 317, which is as follows:
"This peculiar result is reached by holding an accommo-
dation indorser to be a party primarily liable because Section
29 makes an accommodation party, whether he is maker,
drawer, acceptor or indorser, liable to a holder for value; but
Section 29 does not enact that all accommodation parties are
liable as principal debtors or otherwise than according to the
liability usually attached to their position on the paper.
"Such a construction of Section 29 is also in the teeth of
Section 192 (Sec. 10161, R. S. of Mo., 1909,) which defines the
person primarily liable on an instrument as the person who
by the terms of the instrument is absolutely required to pay
the same."
WVith all due deference to the learned Judge who wrote the
opinion, we respectfully submit that the decision is unsup-
ported in either authority or reason and should, at the earliest
possible moment, be repudiated by our Appellate Courts so
that any doubt that it creates might be entirely removed.
JosEp I . GRAI.
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